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Introduction
From the mid-nineteenth century, and in common with other parts of Europe, the Netherlands experienced a significant growth in the formal provision of personal finance (Polsi, 1996; Guinnane, 2001; McLaughlin, 2014) . During this period, a variety of new financial institutions emerged across the Netherlands with the aim of providing savings and loans solutions, especially to low and middle-class clienteles (Deneweth et al., 2014) . Then, in the mid-1890s, a new type of bank entered the Dutch market: Raiffeisen banks (boerenleenbanken). These banks had a new organisational form: they were cooperatives. And unlike incumbents, which specialised in providing either savings or loans services, these new entrants were savings-andloans institutions.
The entrance of the Raiffeisen banks raises several questions, which have much broader applicability than simply to Dutch economic history. The first question is: why these financial institutions emerged in the first place? The second, related, question is: did the same factors which underpinned their emergence also contribute to their early success? In essence, we are asking: what was it about rural society that facilitated the entry of this new type of bank? And we do this by exploiting differences in rural society across one polity. Raiffeisen banks emerged elsewhere in Europe-sometimes simultaneously with those in the Netherlands-but they had wildly different levels of success (Colvin and McLaughlin, 2014) . Our intention is that systematically exploring differences in adoption and performance across one polity will inform future research that explores differences across polities.
We argue that the cooperative form adopted by Raiffeisen banks enabled them to respond to the changing economic and social environment of the time, which ensured their survival in a "Darwinian struggle" for savings and loans. This does not mean great foresight or skill on the part of the founders of these Raiffeisen banks-they simply chose an organisational form that they saw working elsewhere in the country, or even abroad, and adapted it to their situation. As such, this paper is very much in the spirit of Alchian (1950) , who argues that new organisational forms emerge or mutate when the environment changes, and that the institutional attributes of their new organisational forms help these new enterprises survive and compete.
In attempting to answer the question as to what facet of the Netherlands' business environment facilitated the emergence of cooperative banks, we focus on three major socioeconomic changes which may explain the timing of their entry: (1) to meet untapped market demand for financial services from the unbanked and underbanked (see, e.g., Sluyterman et al., 1998) ; (2) as a response to agricultural depression and technological change, which created a need for agricultural credit (see, e.g., Bieleman, 2008) ; and (3) as a means of extending and consolidating the influence of confessional, pillarised, sociopolitical organisations across Dutch society (see, e.g., Jonker, 1988a,b) . By considering these alternative explanations together in one analysis, we aim to deduce the factors that precipitated entry of these cooperative banks. Having entered, we then test to see whether these very same socioeconomic factors influenced subsequent operational effectiveness, i.e., their survival.
Indeed, existing evidence from the nineteenth century shows that early socioeconomic, particularly philanthropic, influences on organisational innovation can quickly recede amidst the realities of the marketplace (Ó Gráda, 2008; Maltby, 2012, 2015) .
We test our hypotheses by conducting an econometric analysis of a new dataset which we hand-collected, and which contains bank-level information on all Raiffeisen banks and their competitors collated from annual reports published by the Netherlands' statistical agencies. We supplement these data with demographic, land-type and taxation data taken from other contemporaneous government publications in order to situate these banks within their economic and social geographies. We focus on 1898, 1904, and 1909 because it was over this horizon that the entry of Raiffeisen banks occurred.
In terms of the entry of Raiffeisen banks, we find limited evidence that unmet demand was an important factor in their entry. However, we find that the presence of incumbents was negatively associated with performance as measured by deposit growth and outreach. This may suggest that while Raiffeisen banks offered financial services to a new clientele, they also "competed" with their contemporaries for business. This raises the question as to how they were able to compete in the market for savings, particularly when they were competing with the state-guaranteed Post Office Savings Bank and other long-established rivals. We suggest that the cooperative form-an important facet of which was their choice of unlimited liabilityplayed a vital role in helping the Raiffeisen banks garner funds. Interestingly, we find that the presence of a Post Office Savings Bank branch was favourable for bank emergence, and we suggest that the presence of a post office and its associated services was an important part of the infrastructure which facilitated bank entry.
In relation to the agricultural environment, we find that a greater proportion of horticultural land is negatively associated with the emergence of the first banks, and also with their early performance. This perhaps reflects a greater resilience in this sector to the agricultural crisis of the late-nineteenth century, and thus a reduced demand for credit from these types of farmer. This implies that Raiffeisen banks played an important role providing credit to farmers in areas less dominated by horticulture-i.e., where the crisis was felt most acutely-and the demand among farmers for financial services was highest.
In terms of non-economic factors, we find that the percentage of Roman Catholics in a municipality played an important role in stimulating the entry of Raiffeisen banks. However, with regards to the early performance and success of these banks, our results suggest that these non-economic factors played a more limited role. We conclude that while Catholic influence may have been an important initial catalyst in the emergence of Raiffeisen banks, in the longer term it was less important for sustained growth, social outreach, and operational success.
Overall, these results suggest that the existence of Raiffeisen banks, in this context at least, should be understood as a response to both social and economic demands. Yes, the agricultural crisis of the late-nineteenth century and an absence of (appropriate) incumbent financiers may have provided an economic rationale for their existence, but it seems unlikely to have been a sufficient precondition. Rather, the Catholic Church, by taking advantage of its religious network, could provide the necessary impetus for the initial diffusion phase. Then, once the banks had been established, the organisational model of Raiffeisen banks was able to benefit from efficiencies accrued from religion-related social collegiality, perhaps with the function of religion ultimately transitioning from philanthropy to economy. This paper augments the literature on the emergence and success of the first cooperative financial institutions. Guinnane's (2001) pioneering work on German credit cooperatives points to their informational and enforcement advantages over other types of organisational form, which helps them survive and even flourish. Our analysis extends his argument by showing how the organisational form interacted with a new socioeconomic environment to ensure its success. Our paper also lends support to Colvin and McLaughlin (2014) , who attribute the success of Dutch Raiffeisen banks relative to their Irish counterparts to their ability to attach onto existing religiously-associated social networks. Indeed, the heterogeneous performance of Raiffeisen credit cooperatives throughout Europe supports the relevance of both the economic and broader social environment (Guinnane and Henriksen, 1998; Galassi, 2001; Garrido, 2007; Beltrán Tapia, 2012; Martinez-Soto et al., 2012; Henriksen et al., 2015) .
In terms of our contribution to Dutch economic history, our analysis is the first work to systematically compare the different hypotheses for the entry of cooperative banks advanced in the literature. It is also the first to adopt a cliometric approach; previous analyses have relied on archival, narrative, evidence. We argue that the methodology adopted in extant works runs run the risk of propagating popular "origins stories", without the systematic evaluation of the available evidence, or the sufficient scrutiny of alternative possibilities.
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>> 2. The Market for Savings and Loans, c. 1900
Incumbents and Entrants
At the turn of the twentieth century, Dutch household savings services were delivered by three main market players: savings banks (spaarbanken), the Post Office Savings Bank (Rijkspostspaarbank), and more latterly Raiffeisen banks (boerenleenbanken). Savings banks had been the sole incumbent throughout most of the nineteenth century, but this changed in the 1880s with the arrival of the Post Office Savings Bank, and again in the 1890s with the arrival of Raiffeisen banks.
From Table 1 we see that savings banks tended to be organised as societies, the Post Office Savings Bank was established by the state, and Raiffeisen banks took either the society or the cooperative organisational form.
1 Savings banks also tended to set up in more urban settings, while Raiffeisen banks, which originally had been exclusively targeted at agriculturalists, tended to establish in rural areas. The Post Office Savings Bank enjoyed national scope; it was bolted onto the country's pre-existing post office network. Savings banks tended to be much more unit-independent than either of their counterparts; 2 the Post Office Savings Bank was a single institution with a network of offices across the country, while Raiffeisen banks were independent, but affiliated according to their religious identity into networks headed by central banks in either Alkmaar, Eindhoven, or Utrecht. Savings banks also held a more complex set of investments than either of their counterparts; the Post Office Savings Bank invested heavily in government securities, while Raiffeisen banks made loans to their members. To illustrate the growing importance of Raiffeisen banks in relative size terms, Table 2 compares them to the other principal savings institutions across time.
1 In practice, the society form could be used to establish cooperative organisations. We argue that Raiffeisen banks established as societies can also be treated as cooperatives as they were organisationally almost identical.
2 Savings banks were not entirely decentralised, with a significant proportion affiliated to the Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen (friendly society). And from 1907, a number became affiliated to a newlyestablished savings bank union (Jacobs, 2005) .
<<INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE>> Similar to its savings counterpart, the market for loans experienced something of an evolution throughout the nineteenth century. However, unlike savings institutions, for which there was not an obvious informal alternative, loan institutions had to compete with a variety of incumbent, private credit providers, such as notaries. Nevertheless, by the turn of the twentieth century at least three main players provided formal small-scale household-credit services: Raiffeisen banks, pawn banks (banken van leening), and help banks (hulpbanken).
The pawn banks, which had existed throughout the nineteenth century, mainly dealt with thousands of low-value pawns, with individuals pawning everything from winter clothing to jewellery (Jansen, 1964) . Help banks, by contrast, emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, and focused on poverty alleviation through the provision of small loans.
3 More latterly, Raiffeisen banks emerged in the 1890s with a particular emphasis on reaching a rural clientele, and fulfilling a dual savings-loans function following Raiffeisen principles.
Loan institutions also differed in their attributes, which are also summarised in Table   1 . First, both help banks and pawn banks were relatively independent, and tended to establish themselves in more urban locations. Raiffeisen banks differed in that they did not sell valuable shares and gained "capital" instead from deposits from their members, who were liable to an unlimited amount. Meanwhile, help banks relied on shares and charitable donations from local elites, and pawn banks on pawns and charity. Unlike the others, pawn banks were linked to the municipal system in which they were located, with this system fulfilling an oversight function.
One common feature shared by all institution types was their reliance on credit provision as their main investment strategy.
In addition to the institutions examined here, loans could be obtained from a variety of other sources, many informal in nature (Deneweth et al., 2014) . Store credit was popular in urban and rural centres alike. Mortgages could be arranged directly through notaries, who acted as financial intermediaries. And private pawn shops operated in urban centres, on the fringes of the law.
Quantitative Description
Here we use statistics published by the Dutch national statistical office concerning savings and loans banks in the Netherlands to consider the distinctions between the various bank types in 1909 using a "performance" framework. In so doing we provide a quantitative outline of the financial landscape ten years after the emergence of the first Raiffeisen bank. We use indicators based on those used by the United Nations (UNCDF, 2006) and the World Bank (Ledgerwood et al., 2013) . To be clear, we are not making any claims about similarity between our historical Dutch savings and loans institutions and the modern microfinance institutions analysed by the UN, but instead we recognise the possible value of microfinance indicators in providing quantitative measures which have an explicit social and economic mission. The measures used are defined in Table 3 .
<<INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE>> 
Organisational Form
The cooperative organisational form was one of the unique attributes which distinguished the entrant Raiffeisen banks from incumbents in financial services. In 1899, the year following the market entry of the first Dutch Raiffeisen bank, there were already 924 cooperative organisations across the agricultural sector, 416 of them in dairying (Wintle, 2000) . Raiffeisen banks were just the latest organisation to adopt this organisational form. Why did these banks adopt the cooperative form? And did this organisational innovation result in their success in the Darwinian struggle for survival and market share?
A cooperative organisation is an association of economic actors that unite voluntarily to meet their common goals-economic, social, or cultural-through a jointly-owned and controlled business venture. Not all cooperatives have the same ownership structure; some are owned collectively by producers, while others by consumers of the business. Raiffeisen banks differed from other early mutual banks, such as UK building societies, in that they were owned by debtors (i.e., borrowers) rather than creditors (i.e., savers). All such banks confined their market to a single locality, or even to members of a single religious denomination within that locality. These Dutch credit cooperatives belonged to one of three networks, the central banks of which acted as clearinghouses, auditing authorities, and lenders-of-last resort for their network (Colvin, 2017) .
While the welfare gains from specialisation and trade are shared between buyers and sellers, at cooperatives the buyers and sellers are the same economic actors, and so welfare gains remain with the cooperators themselves. As a result of this alternative organisational architecture, cooperatives have very different business objectives; cooperatives are not profitmaximising firms in the traditional sense. Indeed, they are arguably not even independent business ventures, but instead simply extensions of each individual cooperator's private interests. Where a conventional company seeks to maximise returns for its owners and managers, a cooperative's owners and managers may instead maximise their own returns by minimising those of the cooperative organisation that they co-use, co-own, and co-manage.
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Dutch Raiffeisen banks, which were unlimited liability organisations, possessed no share capital and, aside from their own resources, had access only to the excess savings which they could borrow from other Raiffeisen banks, arranged exclusively through their central-bank apex institution. They relied on deposits as their principal source of funding. Indeed, in practice, the managers of these banks aimed to attract and retain savings deposits wherever they could, and borrowed externally only when necessary (Colvin, 2017) . The core business objective of these banks, then, was to finance the expansion of their loan portfolio to liable members, and the cheapest possible way to do this was to attract new savings deposits from existing and new customers, members and non-members alike.
The principal organisational innovation that the literature on cooperative credit organisations argues is necessary to render them going concerns is joint liability or group lending (Banerjee et al., 1994; Guinnane, 2001 ). This lending model enables small-scale businesses to borrow with little or no collateral by making cooperators liable for one another's financial losses. Adverse selection is reduced as group members are screened; they must fulfil certain requirements before they can join, such as a minimum deposit or membership of an allied social or cultural organisation. Providing the group is small and geographically concentrated, members are more able to monitor one another's effort and punish bad behaviour through social ostracism, and can therefore reduce free riding and moral hazard. As cooperators are all in similar lines of business, they can more easily verify one another's business performance. As members engage in long-term repeated interaction, and as it is difficult and costly to renounce membership, a cooperative outcome is sustainable which benefits all members at least a little, and from which it is not in the interest of any one member to deviate.
Cooperation in Dutch rural finance occurred simultaneously with-or, indeed,
immediately following-cooperation in other types of rural business. Cooperative organisations were thus emerging across rural areas, changing the ownership and incentive structure throughout agriculture. The returns to the cooperative organisational form adopted by Raiffeisen banks were partly captured by the various other agricultural cooperatives that were instrumental in founding and subsequently using these banks. Indeed, cooperative banks could be viewed as an extension of these other cooperatives, an attempt to further internalise any gains from trade. 7 By self-financing agricultural improvement, farmers were creating vertically integrated business organisations. Not only does this result in the elimination of margins through the supply chain and transaction costs associated with information asymmetries, but it also reduces incentive problems as the owners and users of capital were now the same economic actors.
The successful entry and survival of the Dutch Raiffeisen banks does not imply that their originators were endowed with great prescience and understood that the cooperative form would enable them to compete in the market for savings and loans. According to Alchian (1950) , institutional innovations may work simply because of pure chance-the innovation introduces features to the institution which make it more likely to survive in a new environment. For example, the fact that the cooperative form was ideologically aligned with Roman Catholicism (see next section) may explain why the cooperative form was adopted by Dutch savings and loans banks. Although the innovation was not adopted to help survivability, it had the effect of helping the Raiffeisen banks flourish in the Darwinian struggle for deposits.
However, Alchian (1950) 
Hypothesis Development
This section considers three non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses which may explain the general conditions that influenced the entry propensity and subsequent performance of Raiffeisen banks. In particular, we want to understand how the innovation in organisational form facilitated the emergence and survival of banks which were able to adapt to the new economic and social environment.
Unmet Market Demand
The traditional argument put forward in the literature is that Raiffeisen banks were created in response to an unfulfilled demand for credit from the unbanked and underbanked (Sluyterman et al., 1998; Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004; Bieleman, 2008) . The roots of this view lie principally with the government agricultural inquiries conducted in the late-nineteenth century (Landbouwcommissie, 1890), but perhaps more importantly with the propaganda emanating from the cooperative banks themselves.
Van der Marck (1924), a laudatory note that was used as propaganda, argued that the market entry of cooperative banks meant that farmers no longer had problems finding external financing. If true, this means that incumbent financial intermediaries must have been engaging in either "credit rationing" or "red-lining" behaviour (Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Colvin and McLaughlin, 2014) . 8 While both phenomena force farmers to self-finance or abandon their projects, they imply very different conduct by the incumbent suppliers of financial services.
Credit rationing implies that incumbents could have increased their market share still further and attract additional creditors by increasing the price of their loan contracts, but that they were unwilling to do so due to the potential high risk of such borrowers' projects, or due to the presence of some hidden information about the projects which could make verification of their financial outcomes too costly. Red-lining, by contrast, implies that incumbents could have increased their market share only by reducing the price of their loan contracts, but were unwilling to do so because the expected returns on the projects which such loan contracts would attract were insufficient to cover the full economic costs of intermediation.
Micro-business histories of Raiffeisen banks in the south of the Netherlands by Jonker (1988a) and Brusse (2009) provide evidence that the market for agricultural credit was already satiated by the time the cooperatives entered it, suggesting that the sector's origins were not demand-led. Additionally, Jonker (1988a) shows that the new Raiffeisen banks were largely used as savings institutions, a type of service already provided by incumbents, especially the Post Office Savings Bank. Essentially, the argument is that no new market for banking services-either for borrowing or saving-was created with the arrival of cooperatives, only additional competitors added to an already crowded scene. These studies imply that incumbents were essentially engaging in credit rationing; credit was already available, and incumbents could have attracted more custom by offering services to more risk-loving individuals willing to take on higher interest rates. However, the fact that Raiffeisen banks offered lower interest rates than incumbents meant that they were targeting less profitable opportunities; incumbents were likely red-lining rather than credit rationing. The idea here is that a new organisational technology protected Raiffeisen banks from the associated risk of attracting undesirable, riskier, customers, thus helping them survive in a new environment. The innovation in organisational form helped these banks meet the demand for credit in a new environment where farmers' demand for credit had increased and was being unmet.
The hypothesis is therefore that these business organisations chose a unique organisational form that permitted farmers to compete away a share of the existing financial market from incumbents, and/or deepen the market to capture customers previously excluded from it. Raiffeisen banks may have been able to attract savers in rural parts of the Netherlands and displace incumbents exactly because of their cooperative ownership; capturing producer and consumer surplus meant that the interest rates offered on savings could be consistently above those offered by the Post Office Savings Bank, an organisation which, unlike the Raiffeisen cooperatives, enjoyed a full state guarantee. Cooperators-who were both owners and customers-were able to internalise any profit before it reached the cooperative business organisation itself, by setting below-market interest rates on loans.
Agricultural Change
The timing of the proliferation of Raiffeisen banks across the Netherlands could have been a response to the Long Depression of the late-nineteenth century (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004) . This crisis, which lasted from the early-1870s to the mid-1890s, saw sustained falls in agricultural prices. Grain prices were especially affected, and so arable farmers suffered more than those in livestock and horticulture (Wintle, 2000, p. 175; Bieleman, 2010, p. 155) . Selffinancing agricultural improvement by establishing their own organisations-a form of financial "disintermediation"-was only possible once the rural economy had fully recovered from the Long Depression, when there was sufficient savings surplus to reinvest (Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004) .
Despite the Netherlands' small size, Dutch agriculture was region-specialised and clustered, with areas focusing on plants and animals that best suited their soil type and labour costs. Knibbe (1993) shows significant regional variation in agriculture: coastal provinces were predominantly horticultural, eastern provinces on the German border specialised in growing grains and crops, and northern provinces saw intensive cattle farming. Until the advent of costly artificial fertiliser at the end of the nineteenth century, yields in eastern provinces were far lower than western areas (Wintle, 2000) . The hypothesis here, then, is that the demand for Raiffeisen banks arose earlier in land-types affected most severely by the Long Depression, especially in arable lands, and to a lesser extent in pastures.
However, the growth of Raiffeisen banks from the late-nineteenth century may also reflect ongoing changes in agriculture, which were linked, at least to some extent, to the Long Depression period. Small, family farms flourished (Bieleman, 2010, p. 158 this meant that cooperative creameries located away from urban centres did better than those closer to cities. In the context of the present study, then, the hypothesis on regional variation in the performance of Raiffeisen banks can be further embellished to posit that they were: (1) likely most successful where the type of agriculture conducted there was most in need of this new organisational form; but (2) also where the nature and concentration of their target market, or indeed their customers' target market, was the most cost effective for this particular organisational form. In particular, more urban environments, which were more conducive to private enterprise, either did not demand the market entry of Raiffeisen banks, or, where such banks did enter, were not conducive to their subsequent performance.
Economic Confessionalism
The The argument put forward or implied in the work of Jonker (1988a,b) , Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004) , and Rommes (2014) is that sociopolitical interest groups-the Roman Catholic clergy above all-were crucial in the creation of the first cooperative banks and that these groups viewed cooperatives as a way of consolidating or extending their political influence. 10 Pillarisation affected Raiffeisen banks through institutionalised confessional politics, described most completely in this context in Smits (1996) , and summarised as follows. (Smits, 1996; Van Zanden and Van Riel, 2004) . The founding of new regional unions soon followed and most, in turn, joined the NBB on a federal basis. The Noord-Brabant Christian Farmers' Union (Noordbrabantse Christelijke Boerenbond, NCB) was the largest and most influential such regional union. It was instigated and led by a Catholic priest. In practice, the difference between the agricultural companies and the unions was that the latter's aims were religiously motivated, such as the NCB's aim of 'furthering the interests of God, the family and property' (Smits, 1996) . These unions were predominantly Catholic affairs; farmers from the two majority-Catholic provinces made up 73 percent of the NBB's membership in 1904. The agricultural companies became de facto Protestant when Catholic farmers left them to join their new unions. Jonker (1988b) argues that it was the regional farmers' unions that were the primary instigators of Raiffeisen banks in majority-Catholic Noord-Brabant. Catholic clergy, and others working on behalf of the unions, would visit villages to spread the idea of cooperation. These propagandists would help villagers write their new organisations' statutes and provide them with a small amount of initial financing. Local priests would be recruited to provide these cooperatives with day-to-day "spiritual guidance". In Protestant parts of the country, it was the agricultural companies and other local elites that performed this same function, but only in response to nearby "Catholic-only" cooperative efforts. The hypothesis, then, is that Catholicmajority areas of the country were the first to enjoy Raiffeisen banks, but that religious affiliation became less important over time, as Protestant elites caught up and replicated the work of Catholic elites.
An allied hypothesis concerns banks' local socioreligious status. Following Colvin (2017), the idea here is that Raiffeisen banks functioned as "club goods" for a locality's farmers: the banks functioned as close-knit "credit clubs" which benefitted from improved screening and monitoring, and were strengthened by common social norms, the consequences of which increased the cost of group entry and exit. Banks serving a locality's religious minority group, either Catholic or Protestant, are hypothesised to have been successful at avoiding free riding behaviour, and so could likely organise and enter earlier, and perform better.
Data and Empirical Strategy
We construct a dataset which pools information from a variety of sources in order to investigate our three hypotheses for the market entry and subsequent performance of the Raiffeisen banks.
First, we obtain bank-level information for various savings and loans institutions from annual reports published by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, the national statistical agency. The reports collate accounting information for the various banking organisations, and although they are voluntarily reported, there is good coverage and detailed information provided. 11 Banklevel data are available for savings banks and offices, help banks, pawn banks, and Raiffeisen banks, while aggregated data are provided for the Post Office Savings Bank. The information available covers deposit accounts, loans, the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, the investment account, and, although aggregated somewhat, the occupational background of new savers. 12 We direct our attention to the years 1898, 1904, and 1909 , to focus on the early years of Raiffeisen bank entry. To these data, we also add information about the location of the Post Office Savings Bank branches using its annual reports, because this information is unavailable in the previously mentioned publications. Socioeconomic information is available from the census reports. We use the 1909 census as it provides occupational information for all the municipalities, as well as population density and religious affiliation data. While not all our data are thus from the same year, we take the view that land use and relative tax value did not change radically across the period and so treat these variables as time invariant. Yes, horticulture saw an expansion across the period, but this biases our results against finding an effect for horticulture; any inference we draw is likely to be a lower-bound estimate of the "true" effect.
From the collated data, we construct variables, defined in Table 5 , to test the three hypotheses for Raiffeisen bank entry outlined previously. Summary statistics are shown in Table 6 . First, we include the presence of incumbents to better understand the effect of preexisting supply of banking services on entry propensity. We use dummy variables to account for the co-location of savings institutions, help banks, pawn banks, and Post Office Savings Bank branches in the municipality, taking an earlier observation point to capture the preexistence of these institutions.
<<INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE>> Our second set of hypothesis variables relate to the agricultural environment in which the banks existed. First, we include the relative combination of arable, pasture, and horticultural land. Given that the agricultural crisis of the late-nineteenth century may have affected these land types unequally, perhaps the demand for banks arose earlier in land types affected most by the crisis. Alternatively, banks may also have been a source of credit for more capitalintensive farming. We also account for the extent of farming and urbanisation in each municipality as measured by farmer representation in the population and population density.
In addition, we include land per farmer and tax value because we expect that these may have affected financial-service demand given their association with capital needs and wealth.
Finally, we test our third hypothesis using the percentage of Catholics in a municipality,
given suggestions that the Catholic Church and its clergy may have provided an impetus for 13 In 1909 there were 1,121 municipalities nationwide.
cooperation. Where the unit of analysis is the bank, as opposed to the municipality, we are also able to account for the minority status of a bank. A minority bank is one where its religious association, as indicated by the network to which it is attached, matches the religious affiliation of the religious minority population in that particular municipality.
Our empirical approach takes two stages. First, as related to our three hypotheses, we address the factors which precipitated the entry of Raiffeisen banks. We begin by using bank age as a dependent variable to ascertain the conditions most critical to the entry of the first Raiffeisen banks. Given that the specification is from the perspective of existing banks, we anticipate that the results will reflect most acutely the initial catalyst for their entry. We utilise an OLS model with robust standard errors.
Following this, we employ the presence of a Raiffeisen bank in a municipality by 1904, and then the presence of a Raiffeisen bank which entered between 1905 and 1909, as dependent variables. This differs from the first set of regressions as we now adopt a municipality viewpoint as opposed to a bank-level perspective. We expect that these specifications likely reflect the initial catalyst(s) less acutely, but instead help to reveal whether the early drivers of entry remained important with the advancement of time. Given that the dependent variable is now a binary variable (0 or 1), we utilise a probit model. To be clear, the motivation for using these alternative specifications is to discern how important the underlying hypotheses variables are across time. Indeed, by using bank age, and then juxtaposing early and late entry, we aim to reveal whether particular hypotheses were consistently relevant, or if instead a nuanced interpretation is more appropriate as the new banking form became exposed to the realities of the marketplace.
This dynamic emphasis extends to the second stage of our empirical approach addresses the factors which contributed to the post-entry "success" of Raiffeisen banks, focusing on the 1909 statistics. Here we are interested in whether the factors that induced entry are similar to those which drive post-entry performance. We expect, given the cooperative nature of Raiffeisen banks, that they are not necessarily concerned with profit maximisation, and so utilise a variety of alternative dependent variables to understand and measure their success.
Nevertheless, we begin with return on assets, not to measure profit in a strict sense, but rather to provide an indication of financial sustainability. After all, profits were retained by Raiffeisen banks and paid into a reserve account at the end of each financial year. Secondly, we use deposit growth from the previous financial year. New savings deposits were the principal source of funds for new loans to members, and so we expect that this year-on-year growth reveals banks' ability to take on new business. The final two dependent variables are account size and outreach, which provide an indication of the amount of funds being saved and the number of persons that were being served. As well as using similar hypothesis variables to those used for considering entry, we also control for bank-specific characteristics. We adopt an OLS model for the regression analysis. Table 7 reports the results of an OLS model regressing bank age on a selection of potential explanatory factors. Each of the columns represent alternative specifications, with columns 1 to 4 displaying the regression outputs for each of the hypotheses, and column 5 including the full set of hypothesis variables. For hypothesis 2, we split the regressions into two parts to separate out specific categories of variables.
Results

Market Entry
The first set of hypothesis variables relate to market demand and interbank competition, proxied by the presence of incumbents. The results reveal that the presence of another institution in 1898 is generally not significantly associated with Raiffeisen bank age. As such, the presence, or lack thereof, of other banks in an area does not appear to have driven demand for the emergent banks.
The second set of explanatory variables relates to banks' agricultural environment.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the banks' agricultural emphasis, there is some evidence that the percentage of farmers is positively associated with Raiffeisen bank age. By contrast, land per farmer (in column 3) has a significant negative association with the dependent variable, suggesting that demand for credit among small farmers may have been a driver of earlier bank entry. In addition, horticulture shows a significant negative association with bank age relative to arable and pasture farming. Given that this sector was less affected by the Long Depression, it may have been that there was less demand for credit among farmers in this sector. The magnitude of the horticulture coefficient in column 5 suggests that a bank located in an area that is one standard deviation "to the left" of the mean in terms of horticultural land use is associated with a bank age of 6.6 additional months.
With respect to the final hypothesis, which relates to religion, the results highlight a consistent positive and statistically significant association between bank age and Roman
Catholicism. This suggests that a higher Catholic concentration in a bank's catchment area was conducive to the earlier entry of Raiffeisen banks, fitting well with existing evidence on the role of Catholic clergy in catalysing their initial emergence. Furthermore, the second religious explanatory factor, minority status, also shows a significant positive association with bank age.
This suggests that banks also tended to enter earlier into areas where they served the religious minority population, although in statistical significance terms this association is less pronounced. The magnitude of the Roman Catholic and minority bank coefficients in the final specification suggest that a bank located in an area that is one standard deviation "to the right" of the mean in terms of Roman Catholic concentration is associated with a bank age of 13.9 additional months, while being a minority bank is associated with a bank age of 6.9 additional months. Table 8 provides an alternative perspective to the model used in Table 7 . As stated previously, here the focus is directed to the municipality level as opposed to the bank level.
The first set of regressions relate to Raiffeisen bank entry by 1904, and the second set to entry after 1904, thus separating "early" from "late" entry of banks. The reported coefficients are marginal effects calculated at the means. Turning to hypothesis 2, which concerns banks' agricultural environment, there is some evidence that a larger percentage of horticultural land is significantly negatively associated with bank presence by 1904 (similar to the result for bank age), however it is not significant for the later entry horizon. Furthermore, there is some evidence that a greater percentage of arable land is associated with a lower entry propensity in both years. Tax value and land per farmer are statistically significant for the second horizon, perhaps indicative of the rising importance of wealth for later bank entry. Interestingly, the association is negative, suggesting
Raiffeisen banks entered more depressed areas, which had a lower tax base, later in the period after entering wealthier places first.
For hypothesis 3, which concerns religion, and similar to the results for bank age, both year subcategories reveal a positive and statistically significant association between Roman Catholic concentration and the presence of a Raiffeisen bank. However, perhaps more interestingly, when only the religion variable is included in the regression, the magnitude of the coefficient and the pseudo R-squared value is noticeably lower for the later entry period.
This may reflect the diminishing role of Catholicism, and the diffusion of Raiffeisen banks to all parts of rural society regardless of religion, possibly as the initial impetus provided by the Catholic clergy became less important and as others started to adopt the survival-enhancing cooperative form.
Post-Entry Performance
We begin in column 1 of Table 9 using return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. Here, among the hypothesis variables, only minority bank status shows a statistically significant association with ROA. However, the effect size is small. This limited significance of the hypothesis variables may signal that the conditions which encouraged entry are distinct from those affecting financial sustainability, or, indeed, confirm that ROA was not the most important operational goal of these institutions.
Column 2 presents the results for the second measure of performance: deposit growth.
A number of the hypothesis variables are statistically significant for this specification. First, the presence of a help bank or another Raiffeisen bank is negatively associated with deposit growth. The former may reflect greater poverty in an area, or the ability to acquire loans which reduces saving incentives, while the latter may reflect competition between individual Raiffeisen banks. Furthermore, the percentage of farmers is significantly positively associated with deposit growth, suggesting that a rural clientele was favourable for increasing the pool of savings. 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the emergence of Raiffeisen banks in the Netherlands at the turn of the twentieth century. The case is particularly interesting as these institutions emerged relatively late in the market for household savings and loans, but thereafter quickly spread, and became highly successful, across the country. Conceptualising the existence of Raiffeisen banks according to the formative phases of (1) entry, (2) diffusion, and (3) early performance, has provided a useful framework to examine the strength of alternative hypotheses raised in the literature for their rise in the Dutch economy. Indeed, the particular motivation of this paper has been to understand the temporal salience of these various possible explanations. In other words, did the factors relevant to the initial emergence of these banks remain the same for later entry and post-entry performance?
Overall, the results suggest that timing did matter for the relevance of the various hypotheses variables. Perhaps most notable, is the particular significance of Roman Catholic concentration, which is stronger for earlier entrants than for later entrants, and lacks significance in explaining variation in performance. In contrast with Catholicism, other hypotheses relating to the presence of incumbents and the agricultural environment are generally more important for the later entry phase and in performance.
Two important conclusions emerge from our analysis. Firstly, socioreligious organisations, and especially Catholic ones, likely provided the necessary impetus for bank emergence, albeit in an environment with important, but perhaps insufficient, economic rationales for market entry. Yes, the agricultural depression and perceived lack of incumbent financiers provided an obvious justification for entry, but in this period of pillarisation, it was Roman Catholicism which arguably provided the crucial social capital on which the Raiffeisen organisational form relied-a homogenous network with a leadership receptive to cooperation.
Secondly, while the relevance of religion wanes over time, the relevance of economic factors relating to the presence incumbents and the agricultural environment become more important.
Thus, it appears, that while social capital may provide the necessary catalyst for initial emergence, it is economic factors which matter when a new institutional form becomes more established in the marketplace.
It is important to emphasise that we are not saying that religion is unimportant in the longer term. Yes, the relevance of Catholicism is reduced, but religion-at least in its ability to deliver homogenous networks (Catholic or Protestant)-remains a central tenet of the Raiffeisen organisational form. Indeed, as an evolutionary perspective would predict, Protestants imitated the successful traits of the "Catholic" banks by creating their "own"
cooperative banks, and they, like the "Catholic" banks, benefitted from the trust and informational advantages related to their respective communities. Notes: The attributes in this table are from our own research and are based on the schema used in Hollis and Sweetman (1998) , Guinnane (2011) and Colvin and McLaughlin (2014 Sources: CBS (1898; 1904; 1909/10) Sources: CBS (1909 CBS ( /1910 Boonstra (1990) .
